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I. Introduction
That the law changes over time is no secret. That the law changes based
on the parties involved is less obvious but is still no secret. In the case of the
Haudenosaunee land claims cases, however, the law shifted dramatically and
quickly based entirely on the identity of the parties.2 In less than five years, the
federal appellate courts changed the law so drastically to all but end more than
thirty years of modern Indian land claims litigation, reversing years of relative
fairness at the district court level.3 These actions required a fundamental shift in
the law of equity: the creation of a new equitable defense for governments against
Indian land claims. Thus far there does not appear to be a way for Indian tribes
to counter the defense, and the latest case to be decided puts an end to the first
of the great modern Indian land claims.4 How the courts accomplished so much
in such a short amount of time requires a close reading of the cases and a few
logical leaps.
The first part of this article gives a brief history of the New York land claims,
focusing on the Oneida Indian Nation and the Cayuga Indian Nation of New
York. While the tribes have been fighting the status of this land since the original
agreements were signed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this
article looks to the modern era of land claims in the federal courts.5 The second
part of this article reviews how a decision in the Oneida claims case directly
informed City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.6 The third part focuses on the
Cayuga Nation line of cases and how Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki
changed the fundamental understanding of the equitable defense of laches into
a new defense used to defeat tribal land claims.7 Finally, the fourth part of this

See Robert Porter, Building a New Longhouse: The Case for Government Reform Within the
Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee, 46 Buff. L. Rev. 805, 806–07, 811–12 (1998). Haudenosaunee
means People of the Longhouse in the language. Id. at 806 n.1. Also referred to as the Iroquois
Confederacy, it is made of up the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora
Nations. Id. at 806–08.
2

See Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d at 140–41 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of
the tribe’s possessory claims, reversing the district court’s affirmation of the tribe’s nonpossessory
claims, and remanding for entry of judgment); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki (Cayuga XVI), 413
F.3d 266, 267–68 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court’s award to the Cayuga Nation and
entering judgment for the defendants); Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314, 2010
WL 3806492, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010) (dismissing the land claim with prejudice).
3

4

See Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d at 140–41.

See Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida (Oneida I), 414 U.S. 661, 663–66 (1974)
(holding that there was federal jurisdiction over violations of the Non-Intercourse Act); infra Part II.
5

6
See 544 U.S. 197, 202–03, 221 (2005) (holding that the equitable principles of equity,
acquiescence, and impossibility foreclosed the Oneida Indian Nation from exercising tribal
jurisdiction over lands held in fee by the tribe); infra Part III.
7

See infra Part IV. See generally 413 F.3d 266 (2005).
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article examines the most recent loss, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
where the court admitted the creation of a new equitable defense.8 This defense,
identified as “new laches” or “Indian law laches,” can prevent a land claim from
getting past a summary judgment motion. This defense is no longer traditional
laches but rather an equitable defense that follows none of the rules of equity and
exists only in federal Indian law.9

II. A Brief History
The modern land claims stemming from illegal land transactions between the
State of New York and Haudenosaunee tribes have taken more than forty years to
make their way through the courts.10 These claims have generated famous cases
about tribes, land, the Constitution, history, and an unpredictable time in the
early Republic.11 While originally limited in scope to the tribes directly affected
by the State of New York’s violation of the federal Non-Intercourse Act,12 the cases
decided at the Supreme Court level affect all tribes, not just the ones involved.13
These land claims cases are approaching an end, given the recent United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision in the Oneida land claims case.14
A brief recounting of the legal history of the cases provides a useful reminder of
the environment in which the claims were filed and shows what the claims face
today. In addition, following the cases through the courts can be complicated

8

See 617 F.3d at 118; infra Part V.

9

See infra Part V.

See Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d at 114, 116 (noting the original claim, which was
decided in 2010, was filed in 1970); George C. Shattuck, The Oneida Land Claims: A Legal
History 27 (1991) (discussing the history of the beginning of Oneida Indian Nation in 1970).
10

11
See generally Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226 (1985);
Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida Cnty. (Port Decision), 434 F. Supp.
527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
12
Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006)). The law originally passed in 1790 was designed
to prevent states from negotiating land treaties or agreements with tribes. Id. The final version of
this Act was passed in 1834. Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to
Preserve Peace on the Frontiers, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 177).

See Kathryn Fort, The Vanishing Indian Returns 29 (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law,
Working Paper No. 9-04, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1752430. The result of this
can be either good or bad. Compare Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 674 (allowing tribes to bring land claims
as a federal common law cause of action), with City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S.
197, 202–03, 221 (2005) (holding tribes cannot reassume jurisdiction over land they hold in fee).
13

14

See Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d at 140–41.
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for the casual observer. While many of the tribes of the Haudenosaunee brought
cases, this history will focus on the Oneida Indian Nation and the Cayuga Indian
Tribe because of the finality of the Second Circuit decisions in those claims.15
The claims are based on violations of the Non-Intercourse Act, a law originally
passed in 1790, preventing states from negotiating land treaties or agreements
with tribes.16 Because of the turmoil and power allocations stemming from the
Articles of Confederation, passed in 1781, and then the federal Constitution,
ratified by New York in 1788, New York claimed the Non-Intercourse Act did
not apply to its actions involving tribes within its borders.17 New York’s Indian
policies are detailed elsewhere by historians;18 needless to say, the State, through its
actions and policies, worked to take land from the tribes as quickly and as cheaply
as possible, including sending state agents to disrupt federal treaty negotiations
with the tribes.19 Though the United States had promised to protect the land
of tribes it considered loyal during the revolution, the federal government took
no affirmative actions against the State.20 Pleading ignorance was difficult, given
Congress’s New York location at the time.21

15
See Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314, 2010 WL 3806492, at *1 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 2010) (dismissing the land claim with prejudice); see also Canadian St. Regis Band of
Mohawk Indians v. New York, 573 F. Supp. 1530, 1538 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (dismissing the land
claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction).
16

Ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. at 138.

Barbara Graymont, New York State Indian Policy After the Revolution, 78 N.Y. Hist. 374,
379 (1997).
17

18
See, e.g., Jack Campisi, From Stanwix to Canandaigua: National Policy, States’ Rights and
Indian Land, in Iroquois Land Claims 49 (Christopher Vescey & William A. Starna eds., 1988);
Graymont, supra note 17; Howard A. Vernon, The Cayuga Claims: A Background Study, 4 Am.
Indian Culture & Res. J., no. 3, 1980 at 21.
19

Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki (Cayuga XV), 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 311 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).

20

See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 205 (2005).

Graymont, supra note 17, at 381. There is an interesting historical note during this time.
Edward B. Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore: The 1792 Election Dispute and Its Continuing Relevance,
44 Ind. L. Rev. 23, 26 (2010). In 1792, just after the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act, there
was a contested governor’s race in New York. John Jay, who was a Federalist and eventually became
the governor of New York in 1795, lost to George Clinton, who claimed state jurisdiction over all
Indian tribes and treaty making within the state. Cayuga XV, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 309; Foley, supra, at
28, 53. While it is unclear whether Jay would have stopped violations of the Non-Intercourse Act in
1792, at least philosophically he was in favor of the Act. See Cayuga XV, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 333–34.
Disputed ballots from Otsego County, specifically Cooperstown, decided the election. Foley, supra,
at 28, 47. This area included the land at stake in the claims by the tribes against the State. Treaty of
Fort Stanwix of 1784, 7 Stat. 15; Treaty of Fort Harmar of 1789, 7 Stat. 33; Treaty of Canandaigua
of 1794, 7 Stat. 44.
21
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III. Oneida Indian Nation: Modern Land Claims Cases
Though the Oneida Nation protested the takings of their land since the final
agreement with the State of New York was signed in 1846,22 the first time the
Nation succeeded in the courts was in the modern era.23 The Oneida Nation was
guaranteed its land by the United States in appreciation for the tribe’s help in the
Revolutionary War, but within sixty years, the land had been lost to New York.24
In twenty-seven agreements between the Oneidas and the State, only two had the
required approval of the federal government.25
In 1970, the Oneida Indian Tribe brought a test suit 26 against Madison and
Oneida Counties arguing for the right to be heard in court on the land claim.27
Initially a claim to start negotiations between the State and the Nation, the case
became the basis for larger land claims.28 Since the State generally refused to
negotiate with the tribes, the tribes needed leverage to bring the parties to the
table. If a tribe has no legal recourse, it has no way of encouraging the State
to negotiate on land issues; such legal recourse had been lacking for the past
seventy-five years.29 Originally land claims could not be heard in federal courts
due to a United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision that held
the federal court could be called on to interpret the Non-Intercourse Act but not
enforce it.30 In addition, New York continued to block tribal attempts at suit
in state court.31 The object of the Oneida test case was to obtain jurisdiction in
federal court and was limited only to rent from the current occupants for lands
taken from the tribe in one state treaty.32 The test case lost at the lower levels and
arrived at the United States Supreme Court in 1974, in what became known as

22

Port Decision, 434 F. Supp. 527, 535–56 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).

23

See Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 666, 682 (1974).

Arlinda F. Locklear, The Oneida Land Claims: A Legal Overview, in Iroquois Land Claims,
supra note 18, at 146–47.
24

25

Id. at 147.

Oneida I, 441 U.S. at 663–66; see Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida
(McCurn Decision), 199 F.R.D. 61, 65 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). Originally the case was brought by the
Oneida Indian Nation of New York and the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin. Later the Oneida
Indian Nation of the Thames was added to the suit. McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. at 69–70; Port
Decision, 434 F. Supp. at 532.
26

27

See Shattuck, supra note 10, at 20–22.

28

Id. at 65.

29

Port Decision, 434 F. Supp. at 531; Shattuck, supra note 10, at 13–19.

Deere v. St. Lawrence River Power Co., 32 F.2d 550, 552 (2d Cir. 1929) (holding that a
claim for ejectment was not a federal question).
30

31

Shattuck, supra note 10, at 24–26.

Id. at 26–27 (“1795 New York-Oneida ‘treaty’ purchase, which involved about 100,000
acres of land in Madison and Oneida counties.”).
32
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Oneida I. 33 At that point, the federal government opposed the Oneida Nation’s
petition for a writ of certiorari. Regardless, the case was granted certiorari by the
Supreme Court.34 In what was essentially a jurisdiction case, the Nation won at
the Supreme Court.35
Able to bring the claim in federal court, the Nation went on to prove its case
in the federal district court of New York.36 The trial court bifurcated the case into
a decision on the law and a decision for remedies.37 In the Port Decision, the court
found for the Nation. The court made clear that it realized the larger import of this
test case, specifically that “the problem is [not] limited to this case, this particular
land transaction, the Oneida Indian Nation, or even this area.” 38 The court also
stated it would rather not be deciding this issue, and that it perhaps “could be
avoided by seeking solutions through other available vehicles,” including either
negotiations with the State or congressional action.39
Still, the court characterized the claim as “uncomplicated” 40—the Nation
owned land, it was illegal for the State to purchase land from Indian tribes without
the consent of the United States, the State did just that, and thus the Nation’s title
was never terminated.41 The court found a prima facie case existed both for a
violation of the Non-Intercourse Act and that the land was never abandoned.42
The lower court also discussed the issue of laches. Laches, truly an ancient
defense, is an affirmative equitable defense.43 A defendant argues the plaintiff
33

414 U.S. 661, 661–66 (1974).

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 412 U.S. 927 (1973); Memorandum
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661 (No. 72-851), 1973 WL 173860,
at *13. The timing of the Oneida petition was fortuitous, given the Court’s later stance on petitions
brought by an Indian tribe that are also opposed by the Solicitor General’s Office. See Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as a Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes,
51 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 940–41 (2009) (analyzing the weight given by the certiorari decision-making
process to the opinion of the Solicitor General).
34

35

Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 675, 682.

36

Port Decision, 434 F. Supp. 527, 548 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).

37

Id. at 532, 548.

38

Id. at 530.

39

Id. at 531.

40

Id. at 537.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 540–41.

Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 357, 368 (2009) [hereinafter The New Laches] (noting the first use of laches in English courts
was in 1311); cf. 2 Alfred John Horwood, Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the First
118, 598 (1873) (noting two cases mention laches earlier than 1311: A. v. B. (1293) (a writ of
cessavit) and le Franceys v. de Harcla (1294) (a writ of debt)). Boston University has developed a new
searchable database of the Year Books, available at http://www.bu.edu/law/seipp/.
43
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delayed too long in bringing the claim and the defendant was harmed by the
delay. 44 Laches is essentially a form of prejudicial delay. 45 The counties asserted
that the Nation had waited more than 175 years to bring the claim and they were
harmed by the delay. 46 As the court held, and has been detailed elsewhere, the
Nation had been petitioning in whatever manner available to it for years prior.47
The court stated, “It is quite clear that state statutes of limitations and state laws
of adverse possession and laches would not bar a suit brought by the United
States on behalf of an Indian nation.” 48 Though this case was not brought by the
United States, the court went on to hold that “it would be anomalous to permit
the government as trustee for the Indians, to achieve a result more beneficial to
the Indians than the Indians could, suing on their own behalf.” 49 The counties
appealed the decision even though damages had not yet been determined. The
Second Circuit upheld the lower court and remanded for further proceedings
on damages.50 The counties appealed the decision of the Second Circuit to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and issued Oneida II.51
In Oneida II, the Supreme Court held the Nation could bring suit under
federal common law. 52 The Court also held that the counties did not have any
defenses of merit, including statute of limitations, abatement, ratification, and
nonjusticiability. 53 Unfortunately for the Nation, while the Court offered a
spirited argument against laches in a footnote, 54 the Court claimed it did not

44

Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution § 2.4(4) (2d ed. 1993).

45

Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961).

46

Port Decision, 434 F. Supp. at 541.

Id. at 536–37; Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred
Obligations, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 605, 616–27 (2006).
47

48

Port Decision, 434 F. Supp. at 542.

49

Id. at 543.

50

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 719 F.2d 525, 544 (2d Cir. 1983).

51

Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 254 (1985).

Id. at 236 (“Numerous decision of this Court prior to Oneida I recognized at least implicitly
that Indians have a federal commonlaw right to sue to enforce their aboriginal land rights.”).
52

53

Id. at 240–50.

Id. at 244 n.16 (“In these circumstances, it is questionable whether laches properly could
be applied.”). The Court continued,
54

Furthermore, the statutory restraint on alienation of Indian tribal land adopted by
the Nonintercourse Act of 1793 is still the law. This fact not only distinguishes the
cases relied upon by the dissent, but also suggests that, as with the borrowing of state
statutes of limitations, the application of laches would appear to be inconsistent with
established federal policy. Although the issue of laches is not before us, we add these
observations in response to the dissent.
Id. (citation omitted).
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reach the issue in the decision because it was not preserved in the record.55 This
paragraph left the question of laches open, and Justice Stevens’s dissent outlined
how the State might continue to argue laches in the lower courts.56
Justice Stevens pointed out the ease with which laches could be applied and
that it would avoid the need for “a historian’s inquiry” into “archaic limitation
doctrines.” 57 In addition, his dissent likely helped convince the tribe that it needed
to start arguing why its so-called “delay” was justified, hoping to convince courts
on that arm of laches. When the tribes were able to demonstrate their continued
attempts to regain the land, the courts shifted what laches meant, moving from
delay to disruption. 58 As in other decisions in this line of cases, Justice Stevens’s
repeated use of the word “ancient” in association with the land claim drove home
the assertion that these claims were just too old and ultimately too disruptive to
go forward.59

A. Oneida Land Claims After Oneida II
After Oneida I, the Nation proceeded to challenge a larger claim that covered
around thirty tribal state agreements that led to the loss of approximately 250,000
acres. 60 That claim, filed in 1974, was stayed by the court from 1978 through 1998
to accommodate sporadic settlement negotiations.61 By 2000, the Oneida Indian
Nation expanded its request for damages, which was originally $10,000 in 1974.62
55

Id. at 244–45.

56

Id. at 261–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

57

Id. at 261–62.

See Cayuga XVI, 413 F.3d 266, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) (“To summarize: the import of Sherrill
is that ‘disruptive,’ forward-looking claims, a category exemplified by possessory land claims, are
subject to equitable defenses, including laches.”).
58

Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 261 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“this ancient claim at common law”);
id. at 262 (“governing ancient Indian claims”); id. at 270 (“The remedy for the ancient wrong”);
id. at 272 (“with respect to ancient claims”); id. (“the intention of reviving ancient claims”); id. at
273 (“common-law wisdom the ancient claims”); id. at 272 n.28 (“hospitable treatment that these
ancient claims received”). The dissent points out that it is “worthy of emphasis that this claim arose
when George Washington was the President of the United States,” indicating that events at this time
occurred too long ago to be litigated. Id. at 256. However, for strict textualists, and certain elements
of society today, the days of the Founding are of recent enough vintage to emulate. Id. Either the
claims and the actions of the government are “ancient” or they are relevant today. Id.
59

60

McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. 61, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).

61

Id. at 73.

62

Id. at 67. The court stated,
On the face of it, the monetary damages which the Oneidas are now seeking
are quite broad, especially when considered in light of the potential liability of any
single, individual private landowner. More specifically, they are claiming entitlement
“to damages from each member of the Landholder Class . . . , with interest, in the
amount of (a) the fair market rental value of the relevant portions of the subject lands,
as improved, for the period of their occupancy by that member of the Landholder

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss2/4
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In addition, in a move which ultimately harmed its case, the Nation sought to add
individual landowners, including non-state actors, to the case.63 Presumably, this
was in response to the failed negotiations that led to the case being reassigned in
1998 and a decision handed down in 2000. This brinksmanship on the part of the
Nation to include individual landowners in the claim after thirty years of claiming
the opposite was to force the counties and State back to the negotiating table in
good faith, but it infuriated a court already upset at the failure of nearly twenty
years of negotiations.64
When the Oneida Nation, and the United States as plaintiff-intervenor,
decided to include individual landowners in its complaint as part of a bargaining
tactic against the State, the court wrote a memorandum expressing its displeasure.65

Class, (b) the amount by which the value of any relevant portion of the subject lands
was diminished by any damage, pollution or destruction that occurred during the
period of their occupancy by that member of the Landholder Class, (c) the value of
all minerals and other resources taken from the subject lands by that member of the
Landholder Class (and those purporting to act with that member’s permission) during
the period of that member’s occupancy of the subject lands, equal to the price of such
minerals and other resources in their final marketable state and (d) any diminution in
value of the subject lands as a result of any injury to the subject lands arising from the
taking of such resources.” Considering the extensive nature of these damages which
they are claiming, and based upon the court’s experience in similar litigation, in all
likelihood, any amount which the Oneidas eventually may recover will far exceed the
$10,000 specified in their original complaint.
Id. (citation omitted).
63

Id.

Regardless of which party was at fault for the failure of the negotiations, the State benefits
from not acting, while the tribe is harmed by lack of action. This has put the tribe in the unenviable
position of constantly shifting strategies to force action on the part of the State. See Shattuck, supra
note 10, at 19.
64

65

McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. at 70 n.9, 76 n.15. The court stated,
What is even more bothersome to the court, however, is the fact that both the
Tribal plaintiffs’ and the U.S.’ supporting memoranda were almost completely bereft
of any analysis. They contained only an extremely brief recitation of the standards
governing motions to amend—standards with which this court is fully familiar. In
short, these two memoranda were practically useless and indicative of the cavalier
attitude of these parties, and the Nation in particular, which has pervaded this
litigation and settlement efforts since reassignment of this case in September 1998.

Id. at 70 n.9. The court further stated,
Curiously, the U.S. did not bother to address the prejudice issue in its moving papers,
except to baldly state that the Counties would not be prejudiced. The U.S. gave no
consideration to the potential prejudice to the landowners, especially in terms of the
fact that like the Oneidas, for years they too have taken the position that the private
landowners would not become political pawns in this litigation. Yet that is precisely
what has happened by the filing of these motions.
Id. at 76 n.15.
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Strategically, the tactic might have forced the hand of the State, but in court,
Judge McCurn was not interested in this type of maneuver. The Nation seemed to
lose any sympathy it might have had from the individual landowners. The judge
was incensed at the idea and unhappy with both the Nation’s and the United
States’ briefs on the issue.66
In a consequence perhaps more difficult to predict, the move on the part of
the tribe in adding individual landowners brought in at least one large business,
the Oneida Limited Company (Oneida Limited). Known primarily as a producer
of flatware, the company moved to intervene as a large landholder and employer
in the area but ended up filing an amicus brief. 67 The attorneys from Oneida
Limited did not give any quarter to the idea the Nation might add individual
landowners to the case.68 More importantly, though, Judge McCurn relied heavily
on the Oneida Limited amicus brief in his opinion and helped open the door to
what became the new equitable defense.69
The McCurn Decision itself is a decision as to whether the tribe could add
individual landowners to the land claims. The court weighed the elements under
a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) analysis, which includes undue delay,
undue prejudice, bad faith, and futility.70 Although the court said the finding
involved balancing all the factors involved, the court did not find any “undue

66

Id. at 70.

Id. See generally Memorandum of Law of Proposed Intervenor Oneida Ltd., in Partial
Opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motions to Amend Their Complaints, McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D.
61 (No. 74-cv-187) [hereinafter Oneida Ltd. Memorandum].
67

68
McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. at 73–74 (“Unlike the Counties, who all but conceded
the timeliness of these motions to amend, amicus Oneida Ltd. vigorously presses the undue delay
argument.”).
69

See id. at 88 n.24. The court stated,
Cursory treatment . . . is the hallmark of plaintiffs’ supporting memoranda. . . . In fact,
the pro forma nature of plaintiffs’ supporting memoranda, in part, motivated the court
to grant Oneida Ltd.’s amicus status. As the court anticipated, the comprehensive and
thoughtful analysis set forth in Oneida Ltd.’s memorandum, had the desired effect of
forcing plaintiffs, in response to those arguments, to hone in on the futility issue in
their supplemental memoranda (filed after oral argument).

Id.
70

Id. at 70–72. The court stated,
In a pithy opinion, the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, identified several
factors which have become the benchmark for courts faced with Rule 15(a) motions
to amend. In deciding such motions the Foman Court instructed district courts to
consider the following: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc[.]”

Id. at 70–71 (citation omitted) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
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delay,” 71 nor did it “find that there is undue prejudice.” 72 It did, however, find bad
faith. 73 From the start of the litigation, the Oneida Nation claim was designed to
avoid ejecting private landowners.74 Though the amended claim did not mention
the word ejectment, the court did find that the assertion of possessory claims
had the effect of an ejectment action.75 This led to the court’s analysis on the
futility argument—the analysis that later informed the Sherrill Court’s creation of
“new laches.”
Oneida Limited argued that adding private landowners to the litigation with
the possibility of ejectment was a futile proposition, because “‘no court in this
land has to date ever evicted’ the same, where they have been in possession for ‘the
last 140 to 200 years.’” 76 The court held,
To the extent that the Oneidas in this particular case
eventually may be able to establish that they have possessory
rights in the claim area, such rights do not necessarily encompass
the concomitant right to obtain relief directly from the current
landowners. Similarly, the fact that the Oneidas’ proposed
claims against the private landowners may well be justiciable
does not necessarily mean, a fortiori, that they are entitled to
seek monetary damages from or to evict current landowners.77
To arrive at this holding, the court relied on Oneida Limited’s Yankton Sioux
“impossibility” defense.78 This defense holds, at its most basic, that it is impossible
to return land to the tribes when that land is currently held by private, nonIndian landowners. The court recognized the case was distinguishable from the
Oneida Nation land claim but still found the case useful.79 Claiming the litigation
needed a practical solution and based on its experience in the Cayuga litigation,
the court found it was “impossible” to eject the private landowners.80 In addition,
the court did not allow the tribe to recover monetary damages against the private

71

Id. at 75–76.

72

Id. at 79.

73

Id. at 85.

74

See Shattuck, supra note 10, at 9.

McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. at 82. The finding disregarded the Nation’s stipulation that
it would not seek rent, damages, or ejectment. Id.
75

76

Id. at 89.

77

Id. at 90.

Id. at 91–93 (citing Yankton Sioux v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357, 359 (1926)); see
Oneida Ltd. Memorandum, supra note 67, at 10–14 (asserting the impossibility defense derived
from Yankton Sioux).
78

79

McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. at 91.

80

Id. at 92.
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landowners.81 There may be precedent for the argument that land cannot be taken
back from subsequent private owners, regardless of how the previous owners
took the land from the tribes.82 And as discussed later, dicta in Yankton Sioux
can be read as supporting that proposition.83 What is clear, however, is that the
impossibility defense was used to keep the tribe from adding private landowners
to the land claim.84 It did not apply to the claim against the counties or the State.85
This litigation demonstrates the way holdings in this line of cases that apply to
certain facts (ejectment of private landowners) can and will be adopted by the
court for other fact patterns (tribal jurisdiction over tribally owned fee land).
From a negotiation standpoint, it is perhaps easy to see why the Nation might
have used the addition of landowners to the case as a way to bring the State
and counties to the bargaining table.86 Unfortunately, the Nation seemed to have
misread the court’s patience with this tactic. There could be many reasons for this,
including the twenty year stay in the proceedings immediately prior to this move.
While the tribe had consistently won in the 1970s and early 1980s, by the time
the stay was lifted and the tribe moved to add the landowners in 2000, the mood
had shifted.87 While not yet in the so-called “post-racial” jurisprudence tribes are
facing today,88 the election of George W. Bush and the increase in conservative
originalists on the bench was not in the tribe’s favor.
However, the same judge did decide in favor of the Cayuga Indian Nation in
2005, 89 so it may have just been the actions of both the Oneida Indian Nation
and the United States that led to the angry McCurn Decision, from which the

81

Id. at 94.

See Oneida Ltd. Memorandum, supra note 67, at 11–12 (conceding, however, the cases
indicate there “continues to be a sovereign obligation to pay damages”).
82

83

See infra Part III.B.

84

McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. at 92.

Id. at 94–95 (granting the tribe’s motion to add the State of New York as a party defendant
and quoting Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki (Cayuga XI), 79 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70
(N.D.N.Y. 1999), “Thus, although there is a strong argument to be made that the State properly
could be held liable for all of the damages sustained by the Cayugas, it would be absurd to hold that
a single present day landowner could likewise be held liable for all of these damages.”).
85

See, e.g., Shattuck, supra note 10, at 80 (noting a full year after the Supreme Court decided
Oneida II, the City of Oneida still refused to recognize the existence of the Oneida Indian Nation,
much less negotiate).
86

Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Port Decision, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977);
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1983); Oneida II, 470 U.S.
266 (1985).
87

88
See Fort, supra note 13, at 38–44; see also Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1589,
1614–21 (2009).

Cayuga XV, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 366 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Cayuga XVI, 413
F.3d 266, 267–68 (2d Cir. 2005).
89
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Oneida land claim never really recovered. Whether or not the landowners are
indeed “innocent” as they claim, or had constructive notice, as the Nation claims,
attempting to add them to the case gave the opposition all the ammunition it
needed to start the slow repeal of prior decisions. Looking back over the case
history, it seems clear that the district court decision on the addition of individual
landowners to the case in 2000 was the beginning of the end of the case.

B. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, a Supreme Court decision, was not
directly related to the Oneida land claims line of cases. The Court, however,
tied it tightly to the land claims cases, though the case ultimately involved a tax
issue. The Oneida Nation repurchased land on the open market and held it in fee
simple.90 The land, located within historic reservation boundaries, was not trust
land held by the federal government for the tribe.91 Nonetheless, the tribe ceased
paying property taxes to the local governments on the theory that the tribe had
reestablished jurisdiction over these parcels of land.92 Thus, as the case proceeded
to the Court, it was structured as a tax case, albeit with sovereignty implications.
In Sherrill, the Court went out of its way to ignore the tax questions and focus
almost entirely on the sovereignty questions.93 The Court relayed the long history
of the Oneida Nation land claim through the courts and spent two paragraphs
on the 2000 McCurn Decision denying the tribe the right to add individual
landowners to the case.94 The Court wrote the “District Court refused permission
to join the landowners so late in the day, resting in part on the Oneidas’ bad faith
and undue delay.” 95 The Court proceeded to quote the decision that since the
land had been taken 200 years prior and there had been “‘development of every
type imaginable’” there must be a distinction between the “‘existence of a federal
common law right to Indian homelands’” and “‘how to vindicate that right.’” 96
The Court used some of the reasoning in the McCurn Decision to create the “new
laches” defense.
Relying on three equitable considerations in making its decision, the Court
found that the tribe had waited too long to unilaterally reestablish sovereignty
over the land. 97 Oddly, nothing was stopping the tribe from trying to get the

90

City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 202 (2005).

91

Id. at 211–12.

92

Id. at 202.

93

Id. at 202–16.

94

Id. at 209–10.

95

Id. at 210.

96

Id. (citing McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. 61, 79–85 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)).

97

Id. at 221.
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land into trust with the federal government, in which case, the tribe would then
have “sovereignty” over the land. The Court’s use of the equitable defenses of
laches, acquiescence, and impossibility were strange choices for many reasons.98
As detailed elsewhere, the use of these defenses was questionable at best.99 The
parties did not have the opportunity to brief these defenses;100 laches is generally
not used against a sovereign or in Indian land cases; an acquiescence analysis does
not fit the fact pattern; and impossibility is a contract defense, not usually an
equitable one.101 In addition, the opposing party came to the case with unclean
hands, which should have forestalled laches and delay.102 Regardless, the Court
used what it called laches, impossibility, and acquiescence to defeat the claim.103
Later courts may argue that the Court was using a new defense, finely honed
for Indian land claims, but the Court itself made no such argument in Sherrill.
Rather, the Court seemed to go out of its way to use very old laches cases to give
the appearance that it was not creating a defense specific to tribes.104 The Court’s
holding would later be used by lower courts to extend and stretch laches into
something entirely new.105
See The New Laches, supra note 43, at 375 (“Acquiescence requires knowledge by the
plaintiff at the time of the wrong and requires the plantiff to actively assent to the performance.”);
id. at 376 (noting impossibility usually refers to a contract defense where there is an impossibility of
performance).
98

99
Id. at 374–80; Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A
Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 Tulsa L.
Rev. 5, 7–11 (2005); Singer, supra note 47, at 608–12; see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme
Court’s Indian Problem, 59 Hastings L.J. 579, 590 (2007); Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices of
Sovereignty, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 797, 800 (2006); Patrick Wandres, Indian Land Claims: Sherrill and
the Impending Legacy of the Doctrine of Laches, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 131, 140 (2006).
100
Derrick Braaten, The Right To Be Heard in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation: Equity
and the Sound of Silence, 25 Law & Ineq. 227, 237 (2007).
101

The New Laches, supra note 43, at 362, 374–76, 388.

Id. at 385–87. In addition—and as has been explained at length in another article—the
opposing party has unclean hands as,
102

[c]ertainly the state defendants in these cases were looking to benefit from illegal
and fraudulent activity. The land in question in the New York cases was all taken in
violation of federal law, and usually under questionable circumstances. According to
Professor Campisi, “[i]n 1788 and 1789 [New York] took by fraud and deceit over
seven million acres of land, the largest amount from the Oneidas.” For the state to
benefit from an equitable defense given its illegal and certainly inequitable dealings
with the tribes is “novel indeed.”
Id. (citations omitted).
103

City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005).

Id. at 217 (citing Badger v. Badger, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 87, 94 (1864); Wagner v. Baird,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 234, 258 (1849); Bowman v. Wathan, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 189, 194 (1843)); see
Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 Tulsa L. Rev.
21, 45–47 (2005) (citing Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 329 (1892)) (discussing the ramifications
of Felix, which was also cited by the Sherrill Court as support for its use of laches).
104

Cayuga XVI, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of
Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2010).
105
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An important aspect of new laches, and really the basis for it, is the insertion
of a so-called impossibility defense into the proceedings. Further inquiry into the
Yankton Sioux decision, especially as it is used by the Supreme Court, demonstrates
that the case does not stand for the impossibility of returning land to the original
owners, the tribe. Indeed, while the decision stated that it is “impossible, however,
to rescind the cession and restore the Indians to their former rights, because the
lands have been opened to settlement and large portions of them are now in the
possession of innumerable innocent purchasers,” it further noted,
and nothing remains but to sanction a great injustice or enforce
the alternative agreement of the United States in respect of the
ownership of the Indians. The latter course is so manifestly in
accordance with ordinary conceptions of fairness that it would
be unfortunate if any positive rule of law stood in the way of
its accomplishment. We are of opinion that none exists. The
judgment of the Court of Claims, that such an obstruction is
to be found in the conclusion that the provision for referring
the controversy to this court was legally impossible of execution,
cannot be sustained.106
Opponents to the land claims and proponents of the impossibility doctrine
like to quote the first half of this paragraph but usually leave out the second half,
which points to the legal impossibility doctrine illustrated by Yankton Sioux.107
The Yankton Sioux were suing for monetary relief because of misappropriation by
the United States. As discussed elsewhere, the impossibility doctrine in Yankton
Sioux is a contract defense, where the United States claimed it could both take the
land and not pay for it.108 The Court found that the United States must pay for
the land it stole; Yankton Sioux does not stand for the proposition that Indian land
claims are impossible to adjudicate.
One older decision in the Oneida line of cases held that the Yankton Sioux
use of impossibility is related to the land rather than the treaty.109 This is not,

106

Yankton Sioux v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357–58 (1926).

Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 219; McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. 61, 91 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Oneida
Ltd. Memoradum, supra note 67, at 10.
107

108

The New Laches, supra note 43, at 378.

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1083 (2d Cir. 1982). The
court stated,
109

Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, if the
ejectment of current occupants and the repossession by the Indians of a wrongfully
taken land is deemed an “impossible” remedy, the court has authority to award
monetary relief for the wrongful deprivation. The claim for “fair rental value” is not
so vague or indeterminable that an appropriate remedy could not be designed.
Id. (citations omitted).
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technically, what the Court held. Later courts have found the use of the word
“impossible” in the Yankton Sioux case to be the main holding, when it is part
of the remedy. The true impossibility in the case was between two promises
the United States made in the original treaty. Specifically, the language of the
treaty reads,
Art. XVI. If the government of the United States questions
the ownership of the Pipestone reservation by the Yankton Tribe
of Sioux Indians, under the treaty of April 19, 1858, including
the fee to the land as well as the right to work the quarries, the
Secretary of the Interior shall as speedily as possible refer the
matter to the Supreme Court of the United States, to be decided
by that tribunal. . . .
If the Secretary of the Interior shall not, within one year after
the ratification of this agreement by Congress, refer the question
of the ownership of said Pipestone reservation to the Supreme
Court, as provided for above, such failure upon his part shall be
construed as, and shall be, a waiver by the United States of all
rights to the ownership of the said Pipestone reservation, and the
same shall thereafter be solely the property of the Yankton tribe
of the Sioux Indians, including the fee to the land.110
Therefore, the impossibility was the constitutional question—whether the
Secretary of the Interior could refer the question of ownership to the Supreme
Court, which it could not. When the United States did not act on that promise,
which was constitutionally impossible, the tribe gained fee title over the land. As
quoted in most of the contracts cases Yankton Sioux is cited for, and the circuits
agree that “[t]here hence were alternative methods of performance; and it is well
settled that when a contract provides for one of two alternatives, impossibility of
performance of one alternative does not excuse the promisor from performing
the other.”111 The Court held that the tribe did have fee title over the land, but
110

Yankton Sioux, 272 U.S. at 355.

Crowley v. Commodity Exch., 141 F.2d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 1944) (citing Yankton Sioux);
see Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 462 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1972); Brangier
v. Rosenthal, 337 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1964); Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams,
98 F.2d 166, 173 (8th Cir. 1938) (“Where there are promises in the alternative, the fact that one of
them has become impossible of performance does not in itself relieve the promissor from performing
the other.”); Draken Grp., Inc. v. Avondale Res., Inc., No. 06-CV-595-SAJ, 2008 WL 151901, at *3
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2008). The Ashland Oil court stated,
111

What is the consequence of failure because of impossibility of one of two
alternative performance provisions in a contract? The cases hold that where a contract
requires a promisor to do a certain thing or to do something else the impossibility of
one mode of performance “does not discharge him from his obligation to render the
alternative performance which has not become impossible. . . .”
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when crafting a remedy, the Court did not remove the settlers who had illegally
lived there for the past few years. This was impossible. Not legally impossible, but
culturally impossible for the Court in 1926, a time of allotment and assimilation.
The Supreme Court was not going to move white settlers from the land, regardless
of how it was taken. However, the impossibility defense used in Yankton Sioux was
also used to grant title and a remedy to the tribe, not as an excuse to get out of
a monetary remedy. In the New York line of cases, impossibility, or disruptive,
reasoning now is used to deny tribes monetary remedies for the disputed land.112
Yankton Sioux held that the impossibility of returning land to the tribe required a
monetary remedy for the taking.113
Prior to the New York land claims, Yankton Sioux was used on a fairly limited
basis in Indian land claims, and the case has had limited use in federal Indian law
cases.114 While used a great deal in the Oneida and Cayuga line of cases, there does
not appear to be a line of cases, or a “progeny”115 that stands for the proposition
that it is impossible to give land back to tribes. Instead, when used in Indian law
cases, the proposition is usually that Indian title is as good as fee simple, or at least
deserving of recompense for a taking.116 The Yankton Sioux case was based on

One of the best examples of the application of this doctrine is Yankton Sioux Tribe
v. United States. Here an Indian treaty provided that if the government questioned the
ownership of certain reservation lands the Secretary of the Interior should refer the
matter to the United States Supreme Court for a decision, or, alternatively, if it failed
to do so within one year after ratification of the agreement by Congress this would
be regarded as a waiver which could result in vesting the land and fee in the tribe.
This was antecedent condition of impossibility, but in the course of its opinion the
Supreme Court made clear that the rule applied as well to subsequent impossibility.
462 F.2d at 211 (citations omitted).
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 124 (2d Cir. 2010);
Cayuga XVI, 413 F.3d 266, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Yankton Sioux and characterizing the
monetary claim as “disruptive” and “forward-looking”).
112

113
Yankton Sioux, 272 U.S. at 359 (“That the United States had taken and holds possession
of the entire quarry tract of 648 acres is not in dispute; and since the Indians are the owners of it in
fee, they are entitled to just compensation as for a taking under the power of eminent domain.”).
114
See, e.g., Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation v. United States, 299 U.S.
476 (1937) (cited for the proposition that the right of Indians to the occupancy of the land is “‘as
sacred as that of the United States to the fee’” and was remanded for monetary compensation);
United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 654 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Yankton Sioux for the
proposition that monetary relief is allowed “in lieu of ejectment of innocent land purchasers”);
Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1987); Assiniboine Indian Tribe
v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 906 (Ct. Cl. 1954). So far the case has been used by one other private
party outside of the New York cases seeking to avoid an adverse decision on treaty rights. Brief for
Respondent at 22, Klamath Tribes of Or. v. Pacificorp, 129 S. Ct. 109 (2008) (No. 07-1492).
115

McCurn Decision, 199 F.R.D. 61, 91 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).

Shoshone Tribe, 299 U.S. at 498; Assiniboine Indian Tribe, 121 F. Supp. at 913 (“Moreover,
we believe appellee correctly states that before and after appellant’s former suit the Supreme Court
had consistently held that land granted by the United States to Indian tribes by treaty represented
116
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the purposeful and illegal taking and destruction of a religious and cultural land
base.117 Courts using such precedent show their hands when they are attempting
to dispossess. The initial use of the case by Oneida Limited had its purpose—to
limit the potential remedy of ejectment. By the time Yankton Sioux was used
by the Supreme Court in Sherrill, however, the facts no longer included an
ejectment issue.

IV. The Cayuga Land Claim
The Cayuga land claim took an equally long trip through the court system.
Much like the Oneidas, the Cayuga Nation had an extensive history prior to
the current litigation of trying to get its land back from the illegal treaties 118
entered into with the State of New York.119 New York had a history, prior to the
Constitution, of entering into agreements with tribes to obtain land from them
directly, without federal approval.120 In addition, New York chose to interpret
the Articles of Confederation to allow this. Though the document gave Congress
the right to enter into treaties with tribes and the “exclusive right of ‘regulating
the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, non members of any of the
states,’” the clause further stated, “provided that the legislative right of any state
within its own limits be not infringed or violated.”121
The State entered into at least one agreement in 1784 before ratifying the
Constitution in 1788.122 The Cayugas entered into an agreement in 1789, just
before the passage of the first Non-Intercourse Act.123 Ten days after the passage
of the second Non-Intercourse Act, New York State passed a statute authorizing
agents to claim all of the land from the Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga Nations.124
In 1795 and again in 1807, the State entered into agreements with the Cayuga

a property right protected by the Constitution and that the taking of such property right under the
power of eminent domain required the payment of just compensation.”); Blackfeet & Gros Ventre
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 161, 165 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
117

The New Laches, supra note 43, at 377 n.202.

Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo (Cayuga III), 730 F. Supp. 485 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)
(granting partial summary judgment on the issue that the 1795 and 1807 agreements between the
State and the tribe were invalid).
118

119

See Vernon, supra note 18, at 21.

See Graymont, supra note 17, at 376 (“New York State Indian policy after the Revolution
can be succinctly summarized under three headings: 1. Extinguish any claim of the United States
Congress to sovereignty over Indian affairs in the State of New York. 2. Extinguish the title of the
Indians to the soil. 3. Extinguish the sovereignty of the Six Nations.”); Vernon, supra note 18, at 22.
120

121

Cayuga XV, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 309 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).

122

Id. at 311.

123

Id. at 314–15.

124

Id. at 330.
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Nation, depriving them of all their land save one square mile tract.125 The Nation
worked from 1807 to the present to regain the land or receive compensation for
the taking.126 Like the Oneida Nation, prior to 1958, the tribe could not get
into the state courts, and prior to 1974, the tribe could not get into the federal
courts.127 Regardless, because the State tried to argue the defense of laches, the
Cayugas also had to demonstrate this long history of fighting the takings to avoid
the defense.
The modern Cayuga land claim began after the Oneida test case, with the
first decision in 1983.128 Judge McCurn found that the parties could present
evidence in the land claim based on a violation of the Non-Intercourse Act.129
The case was stayed for nine years after the United States intervened on the side
of the tribe. Negotiations between the tribe and the State failed, and as a result
the case continued in the courts. The court allowed equitable principles into the
proceeding, including laches.130 Additionally, the court did not allow testimony
on the cultural, emotional, and psychological damages to tribal citizens over the
loss of the land,131 nor did the court allow the tribe’s real estate witnesses to testify
at trial.132
However, the tribe won at the district court level, where the court held the
State had violated the Non-Intercourse Act and owed damages to the tribe for the
land.133 In a bifurcated trial, the jury concluded the tribe was owed an additional
$1.9 million for the fair rental value of the land and $35 million for future loss on
the land.134 This was considered at the low end of even the State’s assessment of
the total damages, which was between $40 and $62 million.135 In the second half
of the trial, the bench heard testimony on the issue of prejudgment interest. The
court awarded the tribe $247,911,999.42.136 On the issue of laches, the district
court stated,

125

Vernon, supra note 18, at 23.

Cayuga XV, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 357; see Vernon, supra note 18, at 25–31 (detailing the
actions taken by Cayuga tribes on both sides of the United States-Canadian border to force New
York to act in good faith).
126

127

Shattuck, supra note 10, at 21–26.

128

Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo (Cayuga I), 565 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).

129

Id. at 1329.

130

Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo (Cayuga XII), 79 F. Supp. 2d 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).

131

Id. at 95.

132

Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo (Cayuga XIII), 83 F. Supp. 2d 318 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).

133

Cayuga XV, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 366 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).

Id. at 274 (finding the tribe was owed $3.5 million for the fair rent value of the claim area
and that the State had already paid the tribe $1.5 million).
134

135

Id. at 288.

136

Id. at 365.
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[t]he court cannot find that the Cayuga are responsible for
any delay in bringing this action. The Cayuga’s efforts to seek
redress from the State for the loss of their homeland in 1795,
as recounted above, attest to their perseverance and fortitude.
Those efforts do not support a finding that the Cayuga should be
denied prejudgment interest simply because they took advantage
of the legal and political mechanisms available to them through
the years.137
This victory for the Cayugas was short-lived. Sherrill devastated the Oneida
Indian Nation’s theory of reassumption of tribal jurisdiction over lands reacquired
by the tribe. There was still the possibility, however, that the holding would be
narrowly construed to tribes hoping to resume jurisdiction over lands not taken
into trust by the federal government. However, the Second Circuit decided the
Cayuga appeal provided an out to the modern Iroquois land cases that had been
in the courts since the 1970s.138 Rather than reading Sherrill narrowly, the Second
Circuit decided to read it broadly, extending it far beyond the Sherrill holding.139
The court started with the Cayuga decision.
Cayuga XVI 140 changed the legal landscape for the New York land claims far
more than the Sherrill decision. Although the district court decision awarded the
Cayuga Nation monetary damages for the taking of its land but did not award
the Nation any actual land to exercise jurisdiction over, the Second Circuit still
found that this was a “type of claim to which a laches defense can be applied.” 141
The Second Circuit specifically looked to the Sherrill laches defense and not to a
traditional laches defense.142 Interestingly, however, the Cayuga court still spent
considerable time explaining why laches applied against the United States in this
case, presumably because the application of laches to a sovereign is a relatively new
interpretation of the defense.143 While tribes had been explaining why laches did
not apply to Indian land claims because of delay, the Second Circuit moved on
to a defense it called “disruption,” characterized also by impossibility.144 Claiming
that the original pleading sounded in ejection, the court found that ejection is

137

Id. at 357.

138

Cayuga XVI, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).

139

Id. at 275.

140

Id. at 266.

141

Id. at 268.

142

Id.

Compare The New Laches, supra note 43, at 394–96 (discussing the long history of laches
as it applies to a sovereign), with Lantz v. Comm’r, 607 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2010) (questioning
sovereign immunity from laches in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit).
143

144

Cayuga XVI, 413 F.3d at 277.
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“indisputably disruptive” subjecting the claim to the equitable considerations
from Sherrill.145 The court reversed the district court’s finding, and the Cayuga
land claim, for all intents and purposes, ended.146

V. The New Laches Defense
The Second Circuit combined laches, impossibility, and acquiescence into
a new defense: the “new laches.” 147 This defense was constructed specifically for
Indian land claims and differs from traditional laches in a number of ways.148
The elements of new laches are disruption and impossibility, or prejudice. Indian
land claims are considered disruptive if they may upset the settled expectations
of current landowners. Furthermore, the implementation of any remedy which is
disruptive is impossible, and therefore the claim must be dismissed. Importantly,
the level of disruption needed to dismiss the claim under new laches was set at
the lowest bar, making it possible for states and counties to argue any remedy is
disruptive, even if the remedy is monetary and would come from state coffers, not
from individual landowners.
The courts created a defense that changed the definition of laches and created
a new theoretical, procedural, and doctrinal defense.149 No court openly admitted
this shift, but it was apparent in the case law. Traditional laches would not have
applied in the cases in front of the courts, and even if it had, a number of barriers
inherent in the defense would have arisen. These barriers include a weighing of
the equities, an evaluation of the state’s unclean hands, the role of sovereigns in
the case, and previous court precedent.150
The problem for tribes occurs when courts apply new laches but do not admit
the shift.151 This maneuver can lead tribal litigators to believe they are defending
against traditional laches but are instead defending against a defense designed
specially to defeat the Haudenosaunee land claims. In the latest case, the court
finally admitted what had been obvious to readers of the cases—the defense the
courts were using to defeat the land claims was not laches but rather a new defense
which “evoked” the defense of laches.152

145

Id. at 274–75.

146

Id. at 280.

147

See The New Laches, supra note 43, at 357–58.

148

Id. at 381–88.

149

Id. at 374–88.

150

Id.

Osage Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1265–66
(N.D. Okla. 2009).
151

152

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
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A. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida at the District Court
The Second Circuit’s 2010 Oneida decision took the new laches to its final
conclusion, all but ending the Oneida land claim.153 After the Cayuga decision
ended the Cayuga land claims, the counties brought the same defenses used
in that decision to the Oneida claims. While the district court was bound by
the Cayuga decision on the issue of new laches and possessory land claims,
Judge Kahn still attempted to limit the Cayuga decision in the Oneida district
court case.154
Judge Kahn identified three elements of new laches as it applies to possessory
land claims. First, the “transactions at issue before the Court are of particularly
ancient pedigree; however, Plaintiffs did not seek redress until relatively
recently.” 155 Second, “[m]ost of the Oneidas have lived elsewhere since the midnineteenth century and the land in the claim area has a distinctly non-Indian
character.” 156 And third, “[n]on-Indians have greatly developed the area in
question and have justified expectations that they will continue to maintain their
lives there.” 157 Using these elements, the court found that the tribe’s possessory
claims were barred by both Sherrill and Cayuga. The court stated, “[T]he Second
Circuit was very clear in Cayuga: Indian possessory land claims that seek or sound
in ejectment of the current owners are indisputably disruptive and would, by their
very nature, project redress into the present and future; such claims are subject
to the doctrine of laches.” 158 However, the elements the court identified are not
the elements of the doctrine of laches; they are the elements of new, Indian land
claims laches.159
In addition, the court noted that the “Second Circuit dismissed the Cayugas’
claims in substantial part because the same considerations that doomed the
Oneidas’ claim in Sherrill applied with equal force to the Cayugas’ claims.”160

Id. at 140–41 (affirming the dismissal of possessory claims, reversing the nonposessory
claims, and remanding for entry of judgment and resolution of pending motions).
153

154

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).

155

Id. at 134.

156

Id. at 135.

157

Id. at 136.

158

Id.

The New Laches, supra note 43, at 400. Laches is delay and prejudice; new laches is
disruption and impossibility. Id. In reality, delay is a tertiary consideration, if at all. Id. This may
be because of the evidence the tribe submitted demonstrating the opposite, the number of scholars
who pointed out the long history of the tribes in attempting to bring these claims, and the precedent
of court opinions holding such. Id.; see Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 137 (“Under the
factors to be considered in a laches analysis, as set forth in Cayuga, it is not necessary to determine
whether Plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in pursuing their claims.”).
159

160

Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
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The sad reality, however, is that the Sherrill considerations could have been
limited to the Sherrill fact pattern, which was very different than the Cayuga land
claim. A double leap of logic occurred, which particularly injured the Cayuga
Nation.161 The impossibility defense was first used by the district court to prevent
the addition of individual landowners to the Oneidas’ claim. That impossibility
defense was then used in Sherrill to create the new laches and prevent the Oneidas
from exercising jurisdiction over land the tribe already owned. The Second
Circuit then applied the Sherrill defense to the Cayuga claim, which was entirely
a monetary judgment.
The district court tried to save some of the Oneida claims from the same fate
as the Cayuga claims. During a motion hearing prior to Judge Kahn’s decision,
Judge Kahn showed some discomfort with the idea that all of the claims involved
could be described as “disruptive” and simply ended.162 He tried to see if the
counties or tribes could explain a way for the tribe to obtain some relief following
the Cayuga decision. The attorney for the Oneida of the Thames explained the
contract defense the tribe believed could be used to avoid the disruption prong of
new laches.163 In essence, the tribe’s final line of defense was a fair compensation
argument. Since the State paid so little for land it then sold for far more, the tribes
were at least owed the actual value of the land when it was originally taken.

This reasoning also damaged the Onondaga Nation. See Onondaga Nation v. New York,
No. 5:05-cv-0314, 2010 WL 3806492 (N.D.N.Y Sept. 22, 2010). A full analysis of that case
is beyond the scope of this article, but the court used new laches to dismiss with prejudice the
Onondaga Nation’s claim of environmental stewardship over the lands in question. Id.
161

162
Transcript of Proceedings, Motion Hearing at 5, Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d
128 (No. 74-cv-0187). The transcript states:

THE COURT: In what way would it be disruptive? I know that’s a key word
throughout these cases. But if the Oneida Indians and the plaintiffs are seeking
non-possessory rights, money damages, and if there is title insurance involved, what
would be—we’re not going to talk about lands being taken from anyone—what is the
disruption we’re talking about?
Id.
163

Id. at 31. The transcript further reads:
Mr. Ramos: . . . .
. . . But we also quite clearly allege a fair compensation claim. It’s laid out in
the tail of the paragraphs that Mr. Smith referred to, and we clearly seek relief in
the form of the difference between the value of the property when it was purchased
from the Oneidas and the amount that was paid. This debated as to whether or not
that claim arises from some possessory right, your Honor, I would submit is really a
scholastic debate. There’s no meaning to it for the simple reason that if this Court
were to dismiss, issue an order dismissing possessory claims, that would resolve all the
disruption issues the other side has raised.

Id.
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The court used this argument and identified non-possessory claims in
the opinion. The Oneidas asserted that the State “inadequately compensated
the Oneida Indian Nation for the land transferred to it.” 164 The court found
this claim was not “disruptive” but rather a “retrospective relief in the form of
damages . . . not based on Plaintiffs’ continuing possessory right to the claimed
land, and [did] not void the agreements.” 165 The remedy would be equitable in
nature, a contract modification by the court of the original agreements between
the tribe and the State. The remedy would also be far more limited than the
original claim, but Judge Kahn preserved a part of the Oneida claim in accordance,
he wrote, with both Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent.166 The Second
Circuit did not agree.

B. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida in the Second Circuit
In the appeal of the 2007 decision, the Second Circuit found the equitable
considerations barred even the limited remedy Judge Kahn allowed.167 The
court explained that its decision was not based on traditional laches but on a
new equitable remedy.168 The new remedy is limited to tribal land claims, and
rather than address the issues inherent in applying laches to a sovereign within a
statute of limitations for a non-possessory claim at law, the Oneida court argued
that there is a new equitable defense that originates from the Sherrill Court. The
tribes maintained correctly that the State and counties failed to “establish the
elements of a laches defense,” and the United States argued that “it is not subject
to laches when acting in its sovereign capacity.” 169 The court replied, “We have
used the term ‘laches’ here, as did the district court and this Court in Cayuga, as a

164

Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 140.

165

Id.

166

Id. at 147.

167

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 140 (2d Cir. 2010).

168

Id. at 127. The court stated,
The Oneidas assert that the invocation of a purported laches defense is improper
here as the defendants have not established the necessary elements of such a defense.
It is true that the district court in this case did not make findings that the Oneidas
unreasonably delayed the initiation of this action or that the defendants were
prejudiced by this delay—both required elements of a traditional laches defense. This
omission, however, is not ultimately important, as the equitable defense recognized in
Sherrill and applied in Cayuga does not focus on the elements of traditional laches, but
rather more generally on the length of time at issue between an historical injustice and
the present day, on the disruptive nature of the claims long delayed, and on the degree
to which these claims upset the justifiable expectations of individuals and entities far
removed from the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ injury.

Id. (citations omitted).
169

Id. at 126.
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convenient shorthand for the equitable principles at stake in this case, but the term
is somewhat imprecise for the purpose of describing these principles.”170 In doing
this, the court rendered all of the plaintiffs’ arguments against the application of
laches moot, since the court was not applying laches, but rather a new defense, or
new laches.171
This is the first time a court in this line of cases admitted that the Sherrill
laches did not follow the rules of laches. It also may be the first time an equitable
defense has been created by a court since the 1800s. While laches is a particularly
ancient defense, many equitable defenses also are rooted in fairly old decisions.
Though difficult to establish with complete certainty, one of the more recent
equitable defenses in the United States at the federal level is change in position,
first appearing in a Supreme Court case in 1877.172 Thus, the most recently
created equitable defenses are almost as old as the land claims themselves.
The Second Circuit admitted that the district court did not make findings
as to whether the Oneidas “unreasonably delayed” or “that the defendants were
prejudiced by this delay—both required elements of a traditional laches defense.” 173
In addition, the Cayuga court “applied not a traditional laches defense, but rather
a distinct, albeit related, equitable considerations that it drew from Sherrill.” 174
Few federal courts have ever modified laches with the term “traditional.” Since
1790, the term only appears in fifteen federal cases.175 This is probably because

170

Id. at 127.

Id. at 129 n.7 (“Sherrill’s equitable defense”); id. at 136 (“the equitable defense originally
recognized in Sherrill”); id. (“the applicability of Sherrill’s equitable defense”); id. at 138 (“the relevant
defense, originally articulated in Sherrill”); id. (“the defense established in Sherrill and Cayuga”); id.
at 139 (“the equitable defense recognized in Sherrill”); id. at 140 (“the defense recognized in Sherrill
and Cayuga”).
171

172
Jones v. United States, 96 U.S. 24 (1877); see also Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228
(1848) (duress); The Dawn, 7 F. Cas. 204 (D. Me. 1841) (No. 3,6660) (frustration of purpose).
173

Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d at 127 (emphasis added).

Id. at 128 (“Either way, we are bound by Cayuga and therefore reject the Oneidas’ and
United States’ contention that the district court erred by failing to consider the elements of a
traditional laches defense.”). The court went on to state,
174

This omission, however, is not ultimately important, as the equitable defense
recognized in Sherrill and applied in Cayuga does not focus on the elements of
traditional laches but rather more generally on the length of time at issue between
an historical injustice and the present day, on the disruptive nature of claims long
delayed, and on the degree to which these claims upset the justifiable expectations of
individuals and entities far removed from the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ injury.
Id. at 127.
These numbers are the result of a search of allfeds database on Westlaw for the term
traditional /2 laches, omitting Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d 114, and Onondaga Nation v. New
York, No. 5:05-cv-0314, 2010 WL 3806492 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010), from the count.
175
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the definition of laches has been fairly constant since 1293.176 The courts that
used the modifier used the term “traditional laches” not as one of comparison but
as a description of laches being a traditional equitable defense.177 Only one used
the term to distinguish it from another version of laches, prosecutorial laches.178
Instead, the equitable defense at play in the modern land claims cases focuses
on the “length of time at issue,” disruption, and the justifiable expectations of
those “far removed from the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ injury.” 179 Length
of time is less important in the new defense, since the element is not about
the length of time it took the tribe to bring the claim but simply the length of
time from the initial harm to the present.180 This formulation of delay makes it
impossible for tribes to defend against, because while tribes can show historic
attempts to make their claims, tribes can do nothing about the fact that the illegal
takings happened 200 years prior to the current litigation.
The justifiable expectations prong arises from the impossibility defense
discussed earlier.181 The presence of non-Indians on the land, and their
expectations, make a dispossession or ejectment remedy “impossible.” This, while
parties may disagree, is a plausible argument. The physical removal of current
landowners, colored as the title may be, would certainly be disruptive and seem
impossible to the courts. As noted, however, the issue at hand in the 2010 Oneida
decision is limited to nonpossessory claims, a monetary, equitable remedy that
seeks fair pay for the land. New laches combines the disruption and impossibility
considerations from cases where ejectment or dispossession is a highly unlikely,
but a possible remedy, and applies them to any remedy conceived of by the tribes
or district courts for the illegal takings of tribal lands.
Though briefly addressed by the Second Circuit, another important
consideration in new laches is its relationship to sovereign immunity. Generally
laches did not apply to the sovereign, which was the federal government’s argument
in this case.182 The Cayuga court’s reasoning on this issue was problematic for

176

See supra note 43.

See, e.g., Perez v. Holder, Nos. 06-74403, 08-74373, 2010 WL 5393905, at *2 (9th Cir.
2010) (“Regarding laches, ‘[t]he traditional rule is that the doctrine of laches is not available against
the government.’”); Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Comm., 849 F.2d 1176, 1180 n.7
(9th Cir. 1988) (“These considerations parallel those of traditional laches analysis . . . .”); Pegues v.
Morehouse Parish Sch. Bd., 632 F.2d 1279, 1282–83 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[W]e believe that the more
traditional laches inquiry is the proper manner in which to deal with the tardiness of this suit.”).
177

178

Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

179

Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d. at 127.

Id. (noting the elements focus “more generally on the length of time at issue between an
historical injustice and the present day”).
180

181

See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.

182

See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss2/4

26

Fort: Disruption and Impossibility: The New Laches and the Unfortunate

2011

Laches and Indian Land Claims

401

a number of reasons.183 While the Second Circuit discussed the application of
the new defense to the United States in a brief paragraph, stating the “United
States is traditionally not subject to delay-based equitable defenses under most
circumstances, Cayuga expressly concluded the United States is subject to such
defenses under circumstances like those presented here.”184 The benefit of a new
defense is the lack of precedent. While laches has a long history of not applying
to a sovereign, new laches always has. This consideration is another reason for the
court to acknowledge the new defense rather than trying to fit the facts to match
a traditional laches defense.
A key point, however, is that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
still protected New York State from the limited contract remedy Judge Kahn
proposed.185 While states are not protected by sovereign immunity from the
federal government, they can be from tribes.186 Therefore, in suing the State in
this matter, the Second Circuit held the tribe and the United States needed to
bring identical claims against the State.187 The Second Circuit found that the
claims in the United States and Oneida Nation complaints were not identical.188
The court did not find adequate language in the United States’ complaint to
match the contract claim the district court found in the Oneida complaint.189
As such, the court held the State was protected by sovereign immunity from the
claim since it only came from the tribe. This twist of logic means that the State
enjoys immunity from the suit, while the United States does not enjoy immunity
from new laches. The court’s cursory review of United States’ sovereign immunity
stands in contrast to the multiple pages the court spends on the subject of New
York State’s sovereign immunity.190 The United States attempted to counter this
issue by arguing it could amend its complaint to incorporate the new claim
Judge Kahn pointed out. The court responded, “[W]e have our doubts that this
casual approach to analysis of a state’s assertion of sovereign immunity could ever
be appropriate.”191
Finally, another concern about new laches involves the breadth of the defense.
The court found that new laches is “properly applied to bar any ancient land claims
that are disruptive of significant and justified societal expectations that have arisen
183

The New Laches, supra note 43, at 394–97.

184

Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d at 129 (citations omitted).

185

Id. at 131.

186

Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).

187

Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 178 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1999).

188

Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d at 133.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 131–36.

Id. at 135; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, State Sovereign Immunity and the Roberts Court, 5
Charleston L. Rev. 99 (2010) (discussing the rise of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment in the Rehnquist Court and its probable extension into the Roberts Court).
191
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as a result of a lapse of time during which the plaintiffs did not seek relief.” 192
Further, the defense “is potentially applicable to all ancient land claims that are
disruptive of justified societal interests that have developed over a long period
of time, of which possessory claims are merely one type, and regardless of the
particular remedy sought.”193 These statements are much broader than necessary,
lacking any factual based limits.194 Because the defense arose in Sherrill, a case that
did not turn on a violation of the Non-Intercourse Act, and the defense now has
a loose set of elements not based on the Non-Intercourse Act, the court was able
to make a sweeping declaration of the application of new laches. Whether other
courts outside the Second Circuit will choose this course is questionable;195 what
is certain is that opponents of tribal land claims will.196
New laches is not properly an equitable defense. It is a defense and applies to
Indian land claims, but it does not seek to weigh the equities in a case. The new
laches does not provide any way for Indian tribes to combat it—their equities
are never weighed in this equation. Though the Supreme Court claims it is
informed by equitable considerations, new laches does not fit into the rubric of
equity. If a tribe cannot use any equitable pleading, such as unclean hands, against
the new laches, the words “equitable” or “equity” should be removed from this
defense entirely.
Counterintuitively, then, equitable principles are not as helpful as they
ought to be for tribes. A balancing of equities ought to be beneficial for most
tribes as land claims and other cases often arise out of treaty violations or illegal
actions on the part of a state or the federal government. In addition, the Indian
canons of construction take equitable considerations into account for tribes.197
However, states seem to have taken the advantage in these balancing areas. For

192

Oneida Indian Nation, 617 F.3d at 135.

193

Id. at 136.

The facts in the New York land claims are specific to Non-Intercourse Act violations, which
ought to limit new laches to those specific land claims. The court uses broad language, however,
which could be used to include all tribal claims. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles
and Practices in American Indian Religion and Culture Cases, AALS Annual Meeting, Section on
Law and Anthropology Panel, San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 8, 2011) (paper presentation on file with
author) (noting the implications of the lack of limiting principles in religious freedom cases).
194

195
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL
4808823, at *23 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2008) (drawing extensively from the dissent in Cayuga XVI
to counter the state’s laches argument).
196
See Brief for Respondent at 22, Klamath Tribes of Or. v. Pacificorp, 129 S. Ct. 109 (2008)
(No. 07-1492).
197
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 2.02[1], at 119–24 (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., 2005) (“The basic Indian law canons of construction require that treaties, agreements,
statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed in favor of the Indians; and all ambiguities are
to be resolved in favor of Indians. In addition, treaties and agreements are to be construed as the
Indians would have understood them . . . .”).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss2/4

28

Fort: Disruption and Impossibility: The New Laches and the Unfortunate

2011

Laches and Indian Land Claims

403

example, in United States v. Washington, those opposing the tribe argued for
using equitable principles in interpreting treaty rights.198 As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted, “[P]ersuasive and unambiguous
Supreme Court authority” 199 is more helpful for tribes than equitable principles.
Unfortunately, that type of Supreme Court authority is now usually anti-tribal and
often unhelpful.200

VI. A Brief Respite from Equity
In all of this change, one court did hold for the tribal interests, however.201After
the Sherrill decision, the counties involved brought foreclosure attempts against
the Oneida Nation on the land at issue in Sherrill. The Second Circuit surprisingly
found that while the tribes could not avoid paying property taxes on the land that
was owned by the tribe, but not held in trust by the federal government, the
local municipalities could not foreclose on the properties due to tribal sovereign
immunity.202 Sovereign immunity, which does not help against new laches, still
worked as a shield for the tribe in this case. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
granted Madison County’s petition for certiorari, which meant the case involving
tribal sovereign immunity and the Oneida Indian Nation would have been in
front of one of the most hostile Courts in recent memory.203 Luckily the Oneida

198

157 F.3d 630, 650 (9th Cir. 1988). The court stated,
In support of its use of equitable principles the district court and Appellants
primarily rely on five cases: Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 272 U.S.
351, 357, 47 S. Ct. 142, 71 L. Ed. 294 (1926) (awarding Indians monetary payment
rather than ejecting “innumerable innocent purchasers” from tribal land); South
Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 519 n.5, 106 S. Ct. 2039, 90
L. Ed. 2d 490 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Yankton and acknowledging
that equitable considerations might have limited the remedies available had the
plaintiff tribe prevailed on its claim to 144,000 acres of land); County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 260, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 84 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging that laches be applied to bar Indians’ claim to lands);
Brooks v. Nez Perce County, Idaho, 670 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982) (in an action to quiet
title to a parcel of land, equitable considerations would not bar the claim to the land
entirely, but “[l]ack of diligence by the government in exercising its role as trustee may
be weighed by the district court in calculating damages” for several decades of loss of
use of the land); United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 799 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.
Cal. 1992) (employing tort-law equitable principles to award monetary damages to
the plaintiff Indians, rather than restoring tribal land to them).

Id.
199

Id.

See Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian Tribes, and the
Constitution 211–58 (2009) (discussing why the Supreme Court’s oft-changing precedent is
generally unhelpful for tribal interests and potentially unconstitutional).
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Indian Nation waived its sovereign immunity for this case after certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision to take this
change into consideration.204 The case is still in litigation, but at this moment, the
Supreme Court will not be hearing a case on tribal sovereign immunity. Despite
Justice Ginsberg’s recent appearance in the dissent in a few Indian law cases, she
wrote the original Sherrill opinion.205 Whether Justice Ginsberg would stay in the
dissent given her infamous writing about the Oneida Indian Nation’s lack of tribal
sovereignty over the lands in question was a serious concern.206

VII. Conclusion
The modern Haudenosaunee land claims began in the early 1970s. This is
not, however, the first time the tribes sought redress for the wrongs done to them
in the early days of the Republic. And though the modern claims appear to be
over in the courts, there is no doubt that the tribes will continue to fight these
injustices into the future. How, and in what form, remains unknown, but claims
this long in coming do not disappear because a court finds a new way to dismiss
them. Perhaps the newly-adopted United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples will provide new opportunities for the tribes.207
The courts’ creation of a new defense specifically targeted at these land claims
undermines the courts’ authority and demonstrates the importance of a party’s
identity in litigation. As the attorney for the Oneida of the Thames pointed out,
using laches to dismiss a case after thirty-seven years of litigation sends a signal
about the willingness of courts to redress wrongs done to tribes.208 At the same
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Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (per curiam.).

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S.
95 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Cf. Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1003 (2009) (arguing that perhaps Justice Ginsburg
is moving in her stance on Indian law issues from a low water mark of Sherrill to her recent dissents
in Wagnon and Plains Commerce).

Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Pres. Obama Announces Support for UNDRIP, Turtle Talk
(Dec. 16, 2010, 11:29 AM), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/12/16/pres-obama-announcessupport-for-undrip/; Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, Turtle Talk (Dec. 17, 2010, 12:32 PM), http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.
com/2010/12/12-17-10-announcement-of-us-support-for-undrip.pdf.
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208
Transcript of Proceedings, Motion Hearing at 34–35, Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of
Oneida, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2007) (No. 74-cv-0187). The transcript reads,

Mr. Ramos: . . . Your Honor, my, my point is very simple. This case is not an
academic debate. This case is about righting a wrong that was done years ago to real
people whose descendents are here in this courtroom, three generations of Oneidas
in this courtroom, your Honor, right down to Christopher, who’s 10 years old, who
was born 27 years after this case started, and the irony that this case could be, could
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time, courts are not always the ideal body to decide far reaching and long running
claims. The State of New York and Oneida and Madison Counties took a serious
risk in refusing to negotiate with the tribes, a risk that appeared to be a bad choice
initially but served them well in the end. A more interesting question, however, is
whether the tribes would have ever won these claims in federal court. While the
courts at times find in a fair manner for tribes, using the courts of the conqueror
to achieve these ends has more risk for tribes than for states.
New laches, a pernicious defense not properly called “equitable,” denies all
relief for any land claim, putting a court solution out of the hands of tribes for
now. Ultimately, the new laches fits in with a twenty-first-century “post-racial”
jurisprudence where all harms are equal. Under this reasoning, the illegal and
devastating takings from the tribes in the nineteenth century are equal to any
potential harm done to current landowners through these claims. In actuality, the
courts have found that the harms done to the tribes so long ago are not as severe
as any potential harm to non-Indian landowners today. As the district court wrote
in the 2007 Oneida opinion, “Past injustices suffered by the Oneidas cannot be
remedied by creating present and future injustices.”209 This statement entombs in
case law the idea that it is not the fault of the state, counties, or current landowners
for any harm that happened at the hands of the state, counties, or landowners
in the past. And while there could be arguments over the equities of physically
removing non-Indians from the land at issue, equity is supposed to provide a
remedy for illegal takings, even if that remedy is monetary. For that reason, new
laches is not an equitable defense but something else—a defense of the majority
for the wrongs it never made right.

be dismissed on the grounds of laches after 37 years of litigation, I think it would be
painful and I think it would send a signal, your Honor, with regard to the availability
of redress for wrongs in United States courts. This is a very important decision before
your Honor.
Id.
209

Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
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